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Eliciting von Neumann-Morgenstern 
Utilities When Probabilities Are 
Distorted or Unknown 
Peter Wakker * Daniel Deneffe 
Medical Decision Making Unit, University of Leiden, Leiden, The Netherlands 
The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27706 
and Management Education Institute, Arthur D. Little. Inc., Brussels, Belgium 
T his paper proposes a new method, the (gamble-)tradeoff method, for eliciting utilities in 
decision under risk or uncertainty. The elicitation of utilities, to be used in the expected 
utility criterion, turns out to be possible even if probabilities are ambiguous or unknown. A 
disadvantage of the tradeoff method is that a few more questions usually must be asked to 
clients. Also, the lotteries that are needed are somewhat more complex than in the certainty- 
equivalent method or in the probability-equivalent method. The major advantage of the tradeoff 
method is its robustness against probability distortions and misconceptions, which constitute a 
major cause of violations of expected utility and generate inconsistencies in utility elicitation. 
Thus the tradeoff method retains full validity under prospect theory, rank-dependent utility, 
and the combination of the two, i.e., cumulative prospect theory. 
The tradeoff method is tested for monetary outcomes and for outcomes describing life- 
duration. We find higher risk aversion for life duration, but the tradeoff method elicits similar 
curvature of utility. Apparently the higher risk aversion for life duration is due to more pro- 
nounced deviations from expected utility. 
(Utility Measurement; Probability Distortion; Prospect Theory; Decision Analysis; Risk Aversion; Stan- 
dard Gamble) 
1. Introduction 
One of the most disturbing factors in the application of 
expected utility is that the existing methods of utility 
elicitation yield systematically different results (Her- 
shey and Schoemaker 1985, Nord 1992). The literature 
recognizes a number of disadvantages of each of 
these methods. Of the three most common methods, 
the certainty-equivalent method and the probability- 
equivalent method require precise knowledge of prob- 
abilities. They thus suffer from an important cause of 
the violation of expected utility, namely the misconcep- 
tion of probabilities. The third method, direct scaling, 
does not invoke probabilities. Its validity is, however, 
questionable. There is no reason to believe that the ob- 
tained scale values are the utilities to be used in an ex- 
pectation criterion. A priori, they could be any (nonlin- 
ear) transform thereof. A fourth method, less often used 
in applications, is the lottery-equivalent method. It 
shares several characteristics with the method intro- 
duced in this paper, but still requires precise knowledge 
of probabilities. 
Several variations of the above methods have been 
described (an early survey was given in Farquhar 1984) 
but no new, independent method has been proposed in 
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many years. This paper precisely suggests a new 
method of utility elicitation, the "gamble-tradeoff 
method," or "tradeoff method" for short. This method 
uses, in the context of uncertainty, a technique that has 
been used previously in multiattribute utility theory 
(the "saw-tooth" method in Fishburn 1967; Johnson 
1974; Keeney and Raiffa 1976, ?3.4.7; Kirkwood and 
Sarin 1980; von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986), con- 
joint measurement theory (Krantz et al. 1971; Tversky 
et al. 1988), and in axiomatizations of several risk- 
theory forms (Wakker 1984, 1989, 1994; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992; Wakker and Tversky 1993). The main 
advantage of the tradeoff method is that it minimizes 
the role of probabilities while preserving full validity 
when used in the expected utility criterion. Utilities can 
be generated when a subject distorts or misperceives 
probabilities, or when the subject does not understand 
probabilities. In the latter case, general events whose 
probabilities need not be known with precision can be 
used to elicit utilities. 
We would like to emphasize that we are in no way 
arguing that eliciting utilities with unknown probabil- 
ities is in general superior to eliciting utilities with 
known probabilities. Rather, we claim only that the 
tradeoff method enables one to elicit utilities without 
invoking known probabilities and that this can offer a 
number of advantages. The tradeoff method can per- 
fectly well be applied when probabilities are known. 
The method then still provides more robustness 
against deviations from expected utility than existing 
methods. 
Both under the rank-dependent deviations from ex- 
pected utility (Quiggin 1981; Schmeidler 1989) and un- 
der prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), 
does the tradeoff method not only provide robustness 
against probability distortions, but it even completely 
eliminates the effects of probability distortions. Thus, 
under these theories, the method generates the correct 
utilities. In particular the method can be applied to 
gains and losses in "cumulative prospect theory" (Tver- 
sky and Kahneman 1992), which is the modern version 
of prospect theory. The desirability of developing elic- 
itation methods that remain valid for nonexpected util- 
ity models has been pointed out several times (Farquhar 
1984; Loomes and McKenzie 1989; Hogarth and Einhorn 
1990, p. 799; Birnbaum and Sutton 1992; Weber 1994). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992, ?2.3) described the esti- 
mation of a complex choice model, such as cumulative 
prospect theory, as a problematic issue. 
Another feature of our method is that it can uncover 
deviations from expected utility through inconsistencies 
in the revealed tradeoff comparisons. Thus, the method 
is suited for axiomatizations of expected utility models 
and the rank-dependent generalizations thereof; see 
Wakker and Tversky (1993), Wakker (1994), and the 
references therein. Finally, the elicitation method can be 
used to elicit probabilities indirectly. The entire ex- 
pected utility model can then be elicited without prior 
knowledge of any probability or utility. 
We developed the tradeoff method primarily to be 
applied in prescriptive decision analysis. It is then used 
to construct a rational and truly representative utility, 
where inconsistencies are to be resolved rather than ac- 
cepted. The method is suited for prescriptive applica- 
tions because it allows for convenient cross-checkings, 
and because it appeals directly to a rational decision 
approach: the weighing of arguments. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contrasts 
the tradeoff method with existing methods of utility 
elicitation. Section 3 describes two experiments in which 
utilities are elicited by means of our method, one for 
monetary outcomes, the other for outcomes that de- 
scribe life-duration. It has often been found in the lit- 
erature that risk attitudes depend on the domain and 
the context. We find higher risk aversion for life dura- 
tions than for money. By the tradeoff method, curvature 
of utility can be disentangled from other aspects of risk 
attitude. Thus we find that the higher risk aversion for 
life duration is not due to curvature of utility but to 
more pronounced deviations from expected utility. Sec- 
tion 4 shows that the tradeoff method can elicit utility 
for a number of nonexpected utility theories. Sections 5 
and 6 discuss advantages and disadvantages of the 
method. Conclusions appear in ?7. 
2. Existing Methods of Utility 
Elicitation, and the New Method 
The most fruitful model for normative decision under 
uncertainty is the expected utility (EU) model. Its first 
1132 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE/Vol. 42, No. 8, August 1996 
WAKKER AND DENEFFE 
Eliciting von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities 
axiomatic foundation has been laid down by Savage 
(1954). Normative objections were raised by Allais 
(1953), Machina (1982), and several others. The current 
interest in nonexpected utility models stems from the 
descriptive inadequacy of EU. Several non-EU models 
have been developed. Surveys are given by Machina 
(1987), Fishburn (1988), Karni and Schmeidler (1990), 
and Kischka and Puppe (1992). None of these models 
has as yet reached the stage of being operational for 
normative applications, let alone of being viewed as su- 
perior to EU. As a result, the dominant view still seems 
to be that EU is the proper normative model. This model 
is also the point of departure of our paper. It should, 
however, be recognized that eliciting utilities from cli- 
ents is a descriptive activity, so that prescriptive appli- 
cations still have to reckon with deviations from ex- 
pected utility. This consideration motivated the devel- 
opment of a robust method. 
In EU, probabilities measure uncertainties, and von 
Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utilities are used to 
evaluate outcomes. Decisions are subsequently made 
according to expectations of utility. The probabilities are 
often obtained from experts and utilities are elicited 
from clients. 
We concentrate on holistic utilities and do not discuss 
the decomposition of utility into separate dimensions of 
outcomes (price, fuel consumption, maximum speed, 
etc.); see Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and Dyer et al. 
(1992). For simplicity of the exposition, we assume that 
outcomes are real numbers and that monotonicity holds 
(more is preferred to less). We first discuss existing 
methods of utility elicitation and then describe the new 
method. 
The three most frequently used methods are direct 
scaling, the certainty-equivalent method, and the 
probability-equivalent method. A fourth method, the 
lottery-equivalent method, has not been applied as of- 
ten as the other methods, even though it possesses a 
number of advantages. Under direct scaling, the client is 
asked to evaluate outcomes directly on a numerical 
scale (or some categories), and, for instance, to assign a 
value of 0 to the worst outcome, a value of 100 to the 
best outcome, a value of 50 to an outcome that lies half- 
way between the best and the worst outcome, etc. Direct 
scaling is easy to use and thus has many practical ad- 
vantages. A fundamental problem, however, is that the 
use of direct scaling to elicit vNM utilities lacks a theo- 
retical justification. Even if a person follows the dictum 
of expected utility, there is no reason to expect that the 
values obtained from direct scaling can be used as vNM 
utilities. A priori, they might be any increasing trans- 
form thereof. In addition, direct scaling has sometimes 
been found to be problematic in applications (Torrance 
1976). 
The certainty-equivalent method, the probability- 
equivalent method, and the lottery-equivalent method 
have a sounder theoretical foundation. Specifically, if 
a person were truly to maximize EU and if no mea- 
surement errors were to occur, these methods would 
elicit vNM utilities exactly. We now discuss the 
certainty- and probability-equivalent methods in 
more detail and describe the resulting procedures for 
utility elicitation. These methods are used in the ex- 
periments described in ?3. The lottery-equivalent 
method, introduced by McCord and DeNeufville 
(1986), is discussed in ?4. We denote by (x, p; z) the 
two-outcome lottery that assigns probability p to out- 
come x and probability 1 - p to outcome z. In the 
description of the utility elicitation methods below, 
we first show how one equality of utilities can be de- 
rived from observed indifferences. Next we describe 
what we call the "basic procedure." This shows how 
the elicitation of some desired number of equalities of 
utilities can be implemented. 
In the certainty-equivalent (CE) method, the analyst 
asks the client to compare a lottery (x, p; z) with a certain 
outcome. The analyst then varies the certain outcome 
until the client reveals indifference between the certain 
outcome, denoted CE(p), and the lottery (x, p; z). Sub- 
stituting EU with the vNM utility u, the equality 
u(CE(p)) = pu(x) + (1 - p)u(z) 
is obtained. The basic CE procedure for eliciting util- 
ities is as follows. First, two outcomes M > m are fixed 
such that the range of outcomes between them in- 
cludes all outcomes of interest. For instance, M may 
designate 80 years in perfect health, and m immediate 
death. We assume henceforth that m = 0. One arbi- 
trarily sets u(0) = 0 and u(M) = 1. Then for any de- 
sired probability p the outcome CE(p) is found that is 
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indifferent to (0, p; M). Utility p is then assigned to 
this outcome. 
The CE method is often used in a bisection form, that 
only uses probabilities 2 (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 
1986, and ?3 below). First, the outcome CE(1) is found 
as above. Then an outcome denoted CE'(1) is obtained 
through an indifference CE'(1) (0, 2; CE(1)). Substi- 
tution of EU shows that the utility of CE'(1) must be 1 . 
An indifference CE'(3) (CE(1), 2; M) is used to obtain 
the outcome CE'(3), with utility-. Similarly one finds 
CE'(j/8) for j = 1, 3, 5, 7. For example, CE'(3) is ob- 
tained from the indifference CE'(2) (CE'(-), 2; CE(1)); 
etc. After a sufficient number of questions, each desired 
level of specification can be obtained. 
In the probability-equivalent (PE) method, the analyst 
also asks the client to compare a lottery (x, p; z) with a 
certain outcome y (x < y < z). In contrast to the CE 
method, the outcomes x, y, z are now fixed and the an- 
alyst varies the probability p until the client reveals in- 
difference between the certain outcome y and the lottery 
(x, p; z). That indifference reveals the equality u(y) 
= pu(x) + (1 - p)u(z). In the basic PE procedure, one 
starts with a minimal outcome, say 0, and a maximal 
outcome M > 0, and sets u(O) = 0, u(M) = 1. Then for 
any desired certain outcome x the probability p is found 
such that x - (0, p; M). Consequently, the utility of x 
must be p. 
We now describe the gamble-tradeoff method, or trade- 
off method for short. Its abbreviation is TO method. 
Rather than searching for an indifference between a cer- 
tain outcome and a gamble, this method draws infer- 
ences from indifferences between two-outcome gambles 
(as is also done in the lottery-equivalent method de- 
scribed in ?5). For the sake of clarity of the exposition, 
we first explain the method for the case in which prob- 
abilities are known to the client. The client is asked to 
compare lotteries (X, p; r) and (x, p; R) for X > x and 
"reference outcomes" R > r. The values p, r, x, and R 
are fixed, and the analyst varies X until the client reveals 
the indifference 
(X, p; r) (x, p; R). (1) 
For a perfect EU maximizer CE'(M) and CE() (defined before) 
must coincide. In general, they may differ. 
No conclusions are drawn from one indifference of 
the above form. Instead, the client is asked to compare 
another pair of lotteries, (Y, p; r) and (y, p; R) for Y 
> y and the same reference outcomes R > r. Again p, 
r, y, and R are fixed, and now Y is varied until the client 
reveals indifference between the lotteries: 
(Y, p; r) (y, p; R). 
We substitute EU with the vNM utility function u. From 
the first indifference (1), the analyst derives the equality 
pu(X) + (1 - p)u(r) = pu(x) + (1 - p)u(R), 
thus 
p(u(X) - u(x)) = (1 - p)(u(R) - u(r)). 
The second indifference implies the equality 
pu(Y) + (1 - p)u(r) = pu(y) + (1 - p)u(R), 
thus 
p(u(Y) - u(y)) = (1 - p)(u(R) - u(r)). 
Together these equalities imply p(u(X) - u(x)) = p(u(Y) 
- u(y)), i.e., 
u(X) - u(x) = u(Y) - u(y). 
Thus, the combination of indifferences has revealed an 
equality of utility differences that can be used for utility 
elicitation. 
Now we describe the basic TO procedure by means 
of lotteries (x, p; y). The probability p is fixed through- 
out. First the decision analyst chooses "reference" out- 
comes r < R and specifies a minimal outcome xo (e.g., 
xO = 0). The analyst then asks the client for the outcome 
xl that makes the client indifferent between lotteries (xl, 
p; r) and (xo, p; R). Next, the analyst asks the client for 
the outcome x2 that makes the client indifferent between 
(x2, p; r) and (xl, p; R). From these two indifferences the 
analyst infers that u(x2) - u(xl) = u(xl) - u(xo). Setting 
u(xo) = 0 we get u(x2) = 2u(x1). Inductively, any xj is 
defined such that the client is indifferent between (xj, p; 
r) and (xjFl, p; R), which in combination with the other 
indifferences implies u(xj) = j x u(xi). This process con- 
tinues until a sufficiently wide range of outcomes is cov- 
ered. We can set u(xj) = j x a for any arbitrary positive 
scale parameter u (xi) = a, e.g., a = 1 / n with n denoting 
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the index of the last outcome x,. The reference outcomes 
r, R are chosen close enough to each other so that the 
revealed sequence xi, . .. ., x, is sufficiently narrow and 
gives utility to the desired level of accuracy. 
Note that in the above calculations the only require- 
ment on the probability p is that it be strictly positive. 
Its value is immaterial in the calculations, and all that 
matters is that the same p be used across different lot- 
teries. We use this observation to extend the TO method 
to the case of events with unknown probabilities instead 
of given numerical probabilities. As uncertain events 
are closer to real life experience than numerical proba- 
bilities, a procedure that uses such events can be more 
realistic to clients than a procedure that invokes nu- 
merical probabilities. 
Let A be an event with unknown probability ("sur- 
gery will succeed"), and let (X, A; r) denote the gamble 
giving outcome "X years of survival" if event A obtains, 
and "r years of survival" otherwise. This paper uses the 
general term gamble when probabilities are unknown. 
For the case where probabilities are known, the term 
"lottery" is used. In the example, uncertainty is not in- 
troduced through numerical probabilities, but through 
the uncertainty of events to which the client can relate. 
Calculations are now based on the subjective expected 
utility model. That is, there exists some "subjective" 
probability for event A that is used in an expected utility 
criterion. Indifferences 
(X, A; r) (x, A; R) and (Y, A; r) (y, A; R), (2) 
again imply u(X) - u(x) = u(Y) - u(y), using similar 
calculations as before. The decision analyst can infer this 
equality without knowing the client's subjective prob- 
ability of A. Thus the TO method generalizes existing 
methods. It shares with existing methods the require- 
ment that the client's subjective probability of A be con- 
stant throughout the elicitation procedure. Utilities u(xj) 
= j X a, j = 0, . .. , n are now elicited through indiffer- 
ences (xj, A; r) - (xj-1, A; R).2 
2Obviously, the subjective probability of event A does affect the values 
x and y in the indifferences in (2). It does not, however, affect the 
correctness of the equality of utility differences. Similarly, in the TO 
experiment, the client's subjective probability does affect the elicited 
values x, . . . , x,,, but it does not affect the correctness of our inference 
that these values are equally spaced in utility units. 
Utilities can also be elicited when the client is in- 
formed about verbal probabilities, rather than about nu- 
merical probabilities or uncertain events. For instance, 
one can tell the client that "probably outcome X will 
result, otherwise outcome r will." We denote this by (X, 
A; r) where A abbreviates probably. Indifferences as in 
(2) above imply the equality u(X) - u(x) = u(Y) - u(y). 
That different clients may interpret "probably" differ- 
ently or that the analyst may not know which probabil- 
ity corresponds with "probably" for a given client is 
immaterial. What does matter is that the client assigns 
the same decision weight to "probably" in different 
questions. This can be enhanced by pointing out to the 
client that "probably" indicates the same likelihood 
across all gambles. We thus share with existing methods 
the assumption that the processing of uncertainty does 
not vary during the elicitation procedure. 
3. Experiments 
This section describes two experiments. They are pre- 
sented here first and foremost to clarify the applicability 
of the TO method. The results of these experiments also 
support the arguments presented in the following sec- 
tions. Section 4 demonstrates that the TO utility elici- 
tations reported here are also valid under rank- 
dependent utility and some other nonexpected utility 
theories. 
The subjects of the experiments were all acquainted 
with probabilities and expectations. Most of them had 
heard about expected utility at some point, but not 
shortly before the experiments. The subjects were asked 
to imagine that the outcomes of their decisions in the 
experiment affected their own life duration in the first 
experiment and their own monetary reward in the sec- 
ond one. It was emphasized that there were no right or 
wrong answers but rather that the subjects' answers 
should reflect their preferences. The experiments took 
about 20 minutes per subject. 
Procedure. The experiments were conducted in small 
groups (approximately ten subjects per group) in class- 
rooms. All items were administered with paper-and- 
pencil questionnaires. Because the TO answers served 
as input for the other questions, the TO elicitations were 
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always carried out first. These were followed by the CE 
elicitations, and finally by the PE elicitations. 
3.1. The Life-duration Experiment 
Subjects. The object of the first experiment was to 
elicit the utility of life duration from 54 subjects. Fifteen 
of them were Ph.D. students in economics who were at 
the beginning of a decision theory course in Copenha- 
gen; 15 subjects were undergraduate students in psy- 
chology at the University of Leiden who were enrolled 
in a cognition course; and, finally, 24 subjects were med- 
ical residents at the University of Leiden who were en- 
rolled in a decision theory course. 
Method. The subjects were asked to imagine that 
they displayed symptoms of one of two diseases. These 
symptoms did not allow the subjects to distinguish 
which of these two diseases they actually carried. None- 
theless, they immediately had to choose to undergo one 
of two possible operations. The number of years the 
subject would survive after the operation (followed by 
immediate death) depended on the combination of op- 
eration and disease, as illustrated in Figure 1. The qual- 
ity of life during these years would be normal. Thus 
outcomes are numbers of life-years in this experiment. 
Stimuli for the TO elicitations. Figure 1 illustrates 
the generic form of the TO questions. At an earlier stage 
of the experiment, the gambles had been presented in a 
matrix format but it was found that subjects preferred 
the decision-tree format of Figure 1.3 Prior to the actual 
experiment, the subjects were asked two choice ques- 
tions to familiarize themselves with the setting. For both 
questions, a value of 6 was first substituted for xj in the 
figure. In addition, for the first question a life duration 
of 20 years was substituted for Y in the figure. The sub- 
jects were then asked to indicate their preferred opera- 
tion. The second question was identical to the first one 
with the exception that 8 (instead of 20) was substituted 
for Y. 
In the actual experiment, the value xj = 6 was retained 
for the first question. (In the notation of the previous 
section, this value 6 is xo.) The value Y = 8 was removed, 
'This was also suggested by the editor. 
Figure 1 
disease 1 
common 
operation 
disease 2 xj yrs 
disease 1 2 yrs 
new 
operation y yrs disease 2 
Question 1. Decide for each 0 < Y < 100 whether you 
prefer the new or the common operation. 
Question 2. For large values of Y you probably preferred 
the new operation, for small values the common one. Thus, 
for some value of Y, which we call xl, your preference 
switched from one operation to the other. Fill in this 
switching value on the answer sheet. 
and the subjects were now asked to fill in the number 
of years for Y that would make them indifferent be- 
tween the common and the new operation; this value 
was called the "switching value" for their preferences. 
It coincides with xl in the notation of ?2. Next this value 
xl was substituted for xj, and the subjects were again 
asked to fill in the value (x2 in the notation of ?2) for Y 
that would make them indifferent. Similarly, X3 and x4 
were elicited. The elicited values were written on a sep- 
arate sheet so that the subjects could see their previous 
choices. 
Most subjects asked for the probabilities of carrying 
either disease. They were informed that the people who 
display their symptoms are usually older than the sub- 
jects themselves. And of those older people, about 66% 
carry the unfavorable disease 1 (with shorter life dura- 
tions). The subjects were informed that for young peo- 
ple like themselves the probability of carrying disease 1 
could be expected to be smaller than 0.66. They were 
told that this was all the information that was available 
about probabilities. To avoid misunderstanding, let us 
repeat that we do not think that unknown probabilities 
will in general give better utility elicitations. To the con- 
trary, we think that better results would have been ob- 
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tained in our experiment if probabilities had been pro- 
vided. Our motivation for running the experiment with- 
out giving probabilities is to demonstrate the 
applicability of the TO method to that context. In other 
words, we tested the method in as difficult a context as 
possible. We expect that for most subjects the TO 
method works best with given probabilities, but for 
some it will not. 
Stimuli for the CE Elicitations. Next a bisection CE 
elicitation was carried out on the same subjects using 
the questions described in Figure 2. Each subject's value 
for X4 that was elicited earlier by the TO method was 
substituted in the figure. Obviously, that value differed 
across subjects. As before, two simple preliminary 
choice questions were asked to familiarize the subjects 
with the setting (in one choice question the value 7 was 
substituted for Y, in the other choice question the value 
X4- 1 was substituted). After these preliminary ques- 
tions, the subjects were asked to fill in the value for Y 
that would make them indifferent between the two op- 
erations. We denote this value here by CE(-). In the next 
question the value X4 of the first question was replaced 
by the value CE(M) just elicited, and the value CE(4) in- 
different to (6, -; CE(-)) was then elicited. The final 
question elicited the value CE(-) that is indifferent to 
(X4, 1; CE(b). 
Stimuli for the PE Elicitations. Twenty subjects 
were also available for PE questions (see Figure 3). The 
values xl and X4 obtained from the TO elicitation were 
substituted, and the probability p = PE(xi) was elicited 
to give indifference. Next x2 and X3 were substituted for 
xl to elicit the probabilities PE(x2) and PE(x3) such that 
Xj (X4, PE(xj); x0) also for j = 2, 3. 
Results and Discussion of Expected Value. One of 
the 54 subjects in the life-duration experiment stated 
that he could not answer the questions. Five subjects 
violated monotonicity, suggesting that they had not 
properly understood the questions. Finally, three sub- 
jects had not responded to all questions. All of these 
nine subjects were discarded. The high percentage 
(16.7%) of discarded subjects is a consequence of the 
various tests of monotonicity and the complicated 
chained nature of the experiment. 
Four more subjects were discarded because there was 
no value X4 that would make them indifferent in the last 
question. This is a consequence of the boundedness of 
the life-duration variable and the time spans we chose. 
We could have avoided the nonexistence of X4 by using 
smaller time spans. It is well-known, however, that util- 
ity is almost linear over small intervals. Hence, for cur- 
vature of utility to be nonnegligible, the replies should 
cover a significant part of the subjects' (mostly aged 
around 25) envisioned life duration, which explains 
why no smaller time spans were used. Ultimately, then, 
the responses of 41 subjects were retained for further 
analysis in the life-duration experiment. 
For all three sets of measurements (TO, CE, PE), no 
significant differences were observed between the psy- 
chology students, the economics students, and the med- 
ical residents. This may, of course, be due to the small 
numbers of subjects. As a result, their responses have 
been pooled. The average responses are given in 
Table 1. 
The averages of the TO and CE results are somewhat 
biased downwards because the four highest replies (for 
which no value for X4 exists) were discarded. The 
"trimmed" TO means, which are obtained by also dis- 
carding the four subjects with lowest X4 values, may 
therefore provide better representations. The resulting 
means are then xl = 11.59, x2 = 17.49, X3 = 24.00, X4 
= 33.05. The related CE means for the remaining sub- 
jects are then also somewhat higher, i.e., CE(1) = 10.32, 
CE(1) = 15.68, CE(3) = 22.24; the averages for the PE 
elicitations are all the same as before. 
Under linear utility as in expected value, the TO re- 
sults should satisfy xi - XO = X2 - Xl = X3 - X2 = x4 
- X3. This was found for nine subjects. The average val- 
ues revealed diminishing marginal utility ("risk aver- 
sion"), i.e., the intervals xl - xO, X2 - X1, X3 - X2, x4 - X3 
are ascending. It may be useful to note here that the 
values elicited by the TO (and CE) questions are inverses 
of utility. Diminishing marginal utility is also confirmed 
in a sign test: there were 17 subjects with x2 - xl > xl 
- xo and 9 subjects with the opposite strict inequality 
(a = 0.1); there were 18 subjects with X3 - X2 > X2 - Xl 
and 10 with the opposite strict inequality (a = 0.1); for 
20 subjects, X4 - X3 > X3 - X2 and for 2 the reversed strict 
inequality held (a = 0.001). 
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE/Vol. 42, No. 8, August 1996 1137 
WAKKER AND DENEFFE 
Eliciting von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities 
Figure 2 
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Question 1. Decide for each 6 < Y < x4 whether you prefer 
the new or the common operation. 
Question 2. For large values of Y you probably preferred 
the new operation, for small values the common one. Thus, 
for some value of Y, your preference switched from one 
operation to the other. Fill in this switching value on the 
answer sheet. 
Also in the CE questions, nine subjects maximized 
expected value, six of whom had done so in the TO 
questions too. The CE averages again exhibit diminish- 
ing marginal utility. Diminishing marginal utility was 
also revealed by the PE averages, that were taken over 
the 20 subjects who were available for the PE questions. 
If the subjects use expected value to answer the PE ques- 
tions, then PE(xj) = (Xj - XO)/(X4 - xo) for all j. Re- 
markably, all 20 subjects had larger PE values for j = 1, 
2, and 18 subjects for j = 3. 
Discussion of Expected Utility. By comparing the 
TO results to the CE and the PE results, EU can be 
tested. For a person who perfectly satisfies EU in the TO 
and CE questions, the equalities xi = CE(j/4) will hold 
as both values have utility j/4, for all j. The first three 
entries in Table 2 show that these EU predictions are all 
rejected in favor of the alternative hypotheses indicated 
on top. Thus, the utilities derived from the CE questions 
are more concave ("risk averse") than those derived 
from the TO questions. 
For 19 of the 41 subjects, all three inequalities xl 
> CE(b), x2 > CE(G), X3 > CE(3) hold, and for six sub- 
jects the three reversed inequalities hold (p < 0.01, bi- 
nomial). 
If a person perfectly satisfies EU in the TO and PE 
questions, then the equalities u(xj) = j/4 imply that 
PE(xj) = j/4 for all j. The last three entries in Table 2 
show that these EU predictions are all rejected strongly 
in favor of the alternative hypotheses indicated on top. 
This confirms previous findings that utilities elicited 
through the PE method suggest very high risk aversion, 
i.e., (under EU) very concave utility (Officer and Halter 
1968; Hershey and Schoemaker 1985; Slovic et al. 1990; 
Delquie 1993; Stiggelbout et al. 1994). Here 14 of the 20 
subjects satisfied all three inequalities PE(xl) > 0.25, 
PE(x2) > 0.50, and PE(x3) > 0.75, whereas no single 
subject satisfied all three inequalities 0.25 2 PE(xl), 0.50 
- PE(x2), and 0.75 2 PE(x3) (p < 0.001). 
3.2. The Monetary Experiment 
Subjects. The second experiment elicited utility of 
money from 42 subjects, consisting of 14 researchers in 
finance at the University of Mannheim and 28 under- 
graduate students in economics at the University of 
Limburg in Maastricht. 
Method. The subjects were told that they could 
choose between two types of investments in a foreign 
Figure 3 
common 
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X4 
new 
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1p 6 yrs 
Question 1. Decide for each p =0, 0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.99, 1 
whether you prefer the new or the common operation. 
Question 2. For large probabilities p you probably 
preferred the new operation, for small probabilities the 
common one. Thus, for some probability p, your prefe- 
rence switched from one operation to the other. Fill in 
this switching probability on the answer sheet. 
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Table 1 Average Results From the Life-duration Experiment with 
Standard Deviations between Brackets 
j 0 1 2 3 4 
TO's xi 6 11.3 17.0 23.1 31.5 
(0) (2.49) (4.42) (6.68) (11.7) 
CE(j/4) 10.1 15.2 21.4 
(2.06) (3.96) (6.36) 
PE(x,) 0.535 0.698 0.875 
(0.18) (0.17) (0.13) 
country, the return of which depended on which of two 
possible candidates would win the upcoming elections. 
The unit of payment is DM 1000 for the researchers (1 
DM is worth approximately $0.63) and Dfl 1000 for the 
students (1 Dfl is worth approximately $0.57). As in the 
life-duration experiment, high outcomes were chosen to 
guarantee that curvature of utility would not be negli- 
gible. 
Stimuli for the TO Elicitations. The format of the 
TO questions is displayed in Figure 4. As before, no 
probabilities were provided. The subjects were told that 
the party of candidate 1 had been more successful in the 
past but was running a poor election campaign this time 
around. As a result, it was not clear who would win the 
elections. In the first experimental question, the value 
100 was substituted for xj in Figure 4 (so xo = 100), and 
subjects were asked to fill in the amount for Y that 
would make them indifferent. This amount is x1. In the 
second experimental question, the amount x1 was sub- 
stituted for xj in the figure, and the amount x2 = Y that 
generates indifference was elicited. Similarly, X3 and x4 
were elicited. 
Figure 4 
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Question 1. Decide for each 100 < Y < 1,000 whether you 
prefer the new or the common investment. 
Question 2. For large values of Y you probably preferred 
the new investment, for small values the common one. 
Thus, for some value of Y, your preference switched from 
one investment to the other. Fill in this switching value on 
the answer sheet. 
Stimuli for the CE Elicitations. As in the life-dura- 
tion experiment, CE questions were asked to elicit 
CE(Q), CE(2), and CE(3) for the lottery outcomes x0, X4 
(Figure 5 illustrates CE(M)). 
Stimuli for the PE Elicitations. The PE method was 
tested in the monetary experiment for all students and 
all researchers but one. The probabilities PE(xj) were 
elicited that yield indifferences xj - (X4, PE(xj); x0), j 
= 1, 2, 3. See Figure 6 for j = 1. 
Results and Discussion of Normalization. One re- 
searcher and four students were discarded from the 
analysis because they violated monotonicity. An addi- 
tional student was discarded because she provided 
Table 2 Tests of EU in the Life-duration Experiment 
x1 > CE(4) x2 > CE(1) x3 > CE(3) PE(xl) > 4 PE(x2) > 2 PE (x3) > 4- 
t(40) = 2.86** t(40) = 2.10* t(40) = 2.03* t(19) = 7.17*** t(19) = 5.27*** t(19) = 4.19*** 
Paired samples t-test, one-tailed; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001. Upper row indicates alternative 
hypotheses. 
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Figure 5 
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Question 1. Decide for each 100 < Y < x4 whether you 
prefer the new or the common investment. 
Question 2. For large values of Y you probably preferred 
the new investment, for small values the common one. 
Thus, for some value of Y, your preference switched from 
one investment to the other. Fill in this switching value on 
the answer sheet. 
incomplete answers. Thus the responses of 13 research- 
ers and 23 students were retained for further analysis. 
Before discussing the results of this experiment, we 
should note that these cannot be compared with the re- 
sults of the life-duration experiment, as the two exper- 
iments concern different domains of outcomes. A com- 
parison becomes possible if a suitable normalization is 
performed, and this is the topic of the following sub- 
section. Normalization also is necessary to compare the 
various results of the monetary experiment with each 
other. One reason is that the students faced a unit of 
payment (Dfl 1000) that was somewhat different than 
that of the researchers (DM 1000). Another reason is 
that students' valuation of money can be expected to be 
considerably different than the researchers' valuation. 
The marginal utility of money above 100, relative to the 
marginal utility between 10 and 80, is typically smaller 
for students than for researchers. Therefore students re- 
quire higher returns on their new investment if candi- 
date 2 were to win to make up for the loss that would 
be incurred if candidate 1 were to win. 
A statistical analysis confirms for each TO and CE 
question that the answers of the students are higher 
than those of the researchers. For the researchers, the 
average values of x1 through X4 are 215.38, 345.38, 
503.08, and 709.23. For the students these four values 
are significantly higher, i.e., 306.96, 540.26, 822.43, and 
1133.48 (independent samples one-tailed t-test, p < 0.05 
for all four values). Similarly, the averages of the CE 
elicitations are all significantly higher for the students 
than for the researchers. These differences confirm that 
the responses of the students and the researchers hould 
not be pooled. 
We normalized the TO values xj into nxj = (xj - xo) / 
(X4 - xo) for j = 1, 2, 3. Similarly, the CE values 
CE(j/4) were normalized to 
nCE(j/4) = (CE(j/4) - XO)/(X4 - XO) 
(In the notation nxj and nCE, n abbreviates "normal- 
ized" and does not designate a natural number.) After 
these normalizations, there were no significant differ- 
ences between students' and researchers' responses. 
Also, there were no significant differences between their 
PE values. Hence the nTO, nCE, and PE values of the 
two groups have been pooled. Averages are given in 
Table 3. Let us mention here that the analysis of the life- 
duration experiment could also have been performed 
Figure 6 
common 
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Question 1. Decide for each p = 0, 0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.99, 1 
whether you prefer the new or the common investment. 
Question 2. For large probabilities p you probably pre- 
ferred the new investment, for small probabilities the 
common one. Thus, for some probability p, your prefe- 
rence switched from one investment o the other. Fill 
in this switching probability on the answer sheet. 
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Table 3 Average (Normalized) Results from the 
Monetary Experiment with Standard 
Deviations between Brackets 
j 1 2 3 
TO's nxj 0.238 0.475 0.730 
(0.1 1) (0.13) (0.1 1) 
nCE(j/4) 0.216 0.462 0.697 
(0.09) (0.12) (0.14) 
PE(xj) 0.358 0.563 0.793 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.15) 
with normalized values. That would not have affected 
any of our qualitative conclusions. 
Discussion of Expected Value. The normalized val- 
ues of the TO and CE elicitation provide an index of risk 
aversion within the interval [xO, X41. Higher risk aver- 
sion implies lower normalized values. In the TO ques- 
tions, three researchers and four students exhibited lin- 
ear utility functions, consistent with expected value 
maximization. This corresponds with normalized val- 
ues nx, = j, nx2 = 2, and nx3 = 3. The average observed 
values are smaller, agreeing with risk aversion and di- 
minishing marginal utility. In the CE questions, two re- 
searchers and nine students maximized expected value 
(corresponding again with normalized values nCE(1) 
= 4, nCE(2) = 2, nCE(-) = 3). The two researchers, and 
four of these nine students, had also done so in the TO 
elicitation. Again, the average observed values are 
smaller, agreeing with risk aversion. The PE averages 
satisfy PE(xj) > (xj - XO) / (X4 - xo) for all j, which again 
confirms risk aversion. 
Discussion of Expected Utility. Under EU, the nor- 
malized CE values should be identical to the normalized 
TO values. They, however, turn out to be somewhat 
lower, although the differences are not significant; see 
Table 4. (The averages of nonnormalized CE values are 
even higher than those of the nonnormalized TO val- 
ues.) For 10 subjects all three inequalities xi > CE(1), x2 
> CE(1), and X3> CE(3) were satisfied (five researchers 
and five students), but for nine subjects (three research- 
ers and six students) all of the reversed inequalities 
were satisfied. 
The average probabilities elicited in the PE elicitations 
are higher than the EU predictions 4, 2 3, and these dif- 
ferences constitute again significant deviations from ex- 
pected utility. 
3.3. Comparison of the Two Experiments 
Next we compare the results of the life-duration exper- 
iment and the monetary experiment. The averages of 
the normalized values are given in Table 5, and are il- 
lustrated in Figure 7 below.4 The averages of the nor- 
malized TO values of the life-duration experiment are 
somewhat lower than those of the monetary experi- 
ment, suggesting more risk aversion for life duration, 
but the differences are not significant. Also, the averages 
of the normalized CE values are lower in the life- 
duration experiment, again suggesting more risk aver- 
sion than in the monetary experiment; here, the differ- 
ences are large enough to be significant. Finally, the av- 
erages of the PE values are significantly higher for the 
life-duration experiment, once again confirming higher 
risk aversion there. 
3.4. Discussion of Results 
Summary of Findings. Our experiments have con- 
firmed the general finding of diminishing marginal util- 
ity both for life years and for money. The TO elicitations 
suggest that the outcomes chosen in our experiments, 
coincidentally, exhibit similar curvature of utility for life 
duration as for money. Whereas under EU, the CE and 
PE elicitations should yield the same utilities as the TO 
elicitations, the observed CE elicitations suggest more 
concavity of utility than the TO elicitations, and the PE 
elicitations in turn suggest more concavity than the CE 
elicitations. In the monetary experiment, the differences 
between the CE elicitations and the TO elicitations are 
not significant and thus do not imply rejection of EU. In 
the life-duration experiment, the CE utilities do suggest 
significantly more risk aversion than the TO utilities. In 
both experiments, the PE utilities suggest more risk 
aversion than the CE utilities. PE utilities also suggest 
more risk aversion than TO utilities in the monetary 
It is remarkable that the CE curve for money between CE(? ) and 
CE(3) suggests increasing marginal utility. This deviation of linearity 
is nonsignificant (t(35) = 0.93, p = 0.359, two-tailed). 
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Table 4 Tests of EU in the Monetary Experiment 
nx1 > nCE(4 ) nx2 > nCE(2 ) nx3 > nCE(3) PE(x1) > 4 PE(x2) > 2 PE(x3) > 3 
t (35) = 0.82ns t (35) = 0.41 ns t (35) = 1.01 ns t (34) = 3.34* * t (34) = 2.00* t (34) = 1.69* 
Paired samples t-test, one-tailed; ns: nonsignificant for a = 0.05; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01. Upper row indicates 
alternative hypotheses. 
experiment and much more risk aversion in the life- 
duration experiment. For a person who perfectly satisfies 
EU, the three utility curves for life duration would coin- 
cide, and so would the three utility curves for money in 
Figure 7. Hence our findings constitute violations of EU. 
Factors Inducing Violations of EU. Two important 
reasons for deviations from EU have been proposed in the 
literature: (1) probability distortion, and (2) response 
mode effects. Probability distortion is most pronounced 
for probabilities near 0 and 1, leading to the certainty effect 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 
1992).5 Riskless gambles, yielding an outcome with prob- 
ability 1, occur both in the CE and the PE questions. We 
can thus expect significant certainty effects in our experi- 
ments. This explanation suggests that the utilities elicited 
by the CE and PE method are too risk averse. 
We now turn to the response mode effects. In the CE 
questions, subjects were asked to respond in terms of 
outcomes (money or life duration), in the PE questions 
they had to respond in terms of probabilities. The "scale 
compatability effect," an example of a response mode 
effect, suggests that subjects pay more attention to stim- 
ulus features that resemble the response scale. There- 
fore, they pay more attention to the probabilities in the 
PE elicitations and dislike more the uncertainty of the 
risky choice. This could explain why the PE elicitations 
suggest higher risk aversion.6 
5The certainty effect relates to the relative overvaluation of riskless 
gambles in comparison to risky gambles. 
6 Response mode effects have been used to explain preference rever- 
sals in other contexts. For extensive studies see Slovic et al. (1990), 
Fischer and Hawkins (1993), and Delquie (1993). 
Implications for the Elicitation Methods. The 
above explanations are in line with the findings of the 
experiments. Thus a possible interpretation of our find- 
ings is as follows: The TO method has elicited curvature 
of utility for life duration and for money. In the domains 
of our experiments, the two curvatures happen to be 
similar. The CE method is distorted by the certainty ef- 
fect, which is more pronounced in the life duration- 
experiment than in the monetary experiment. Therefore, 
the CE elicitations in the life duration-experiment deviate 
significantly from the TO elicitations and also from the CE 
elicitations in the monetary experiment. The PE method is 
subject to probability distortion, as is the CE method, and 
therefore exhibits similar characteristics. In addition, the 
PE method is distorted by response mode effects so that 
its results deviate more from EU than the CE results. 
Subjects are more risk averse for life years than for 
money. While the classical EU conclusion would be that 
utility for life duration is more curved than for money, 
our analysis concludes that curvature of utility is similar 
in the two experiments. The difference lies in the devi- 
ation from EU, which is more pronounced in the life- 
duration experiment. 
To conclude, deviations from EU seem to affect the 
CE and PE results while the TO method seems to be 
insensitive to such deviations. A theoretical foundation 
for this claim is derived in the following section. 
4. Eliciting Utility for Nonexpected 
Utility Theories 
This section demonstrates that the TO method can elicit 
utility for some non-EU models. We mainly discuss 
rank-dependent utility theory and cumulative prospect 
theory. We show that for these theories the TO method 
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Table 5 Comparison of the Two Experiments 
nx, nx2 nx3 nCE(1) nCE(1) nCE(3) PE(x,) PE(x2) PE(x3) 
years 0.227ns 0.458ns 0.695ns 0.177* 0.392* 0.630* 0.535*** 0.698** 0.875* 
money 0.238 0.475 0.730 0.216 0.462 0.679 0.358 0.562 0.793 
Independent samples t-test, two-tailed; ns: nonsignificant for a = 0.05; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001. 
completely eliminates the distortions of utility measure- 
ment due to nonlinearity of probability. 
As two-outcome gambles are sufficient for elicitation 
purposes, we limit the description of the theories to 
those gambles. General definitions for multi-outcome 
gambles are given by Wakker and Tversky (1993) and 
Figure 7 Utility Curves Derived from Average (Normalized) Values tunder 
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many other references. Consider our life-duration ex- 
periment, where gambles of the form (X, A; x) were 
used; here A stood for the event "disease 1." Assume 
first that these gambles are valued by a "weighting" 
formula 
s x u(X) + t x u(x), (3) 
where s and t are positive and depend on A and (not 
- A). The most well-known case is, of course, expected 
utility where s and t are probabilities and sum to 1. An- 
other example is the approach, studied in Edwards 
(1962) and other papers, where s and t are "transformed 
probabilities." This approach applies to the case where 
objective probabilities p and 1 - p are given for A and 
(not - A). Then s = f(p) and t = f(l - p) for a probability 
transformation function f, and s and t need not sum to 1. 
Assume again that the indifferences (X, A; r) (x, A; 
R) and (Y, A; r) (y, A; R) hold as in Equation (2). 
Under the weighted valuation proposed above, these 
indifferences still have the same implications as we de- 
rived before under the EU valuation: They now imply 
the equalities su(X) + tu(r) = su(x) + tu(R) and su(Y) 
+ tu(r) = su(y) + tu(R). Then s(u(X) - u(x)) = s(u(Y) 
- u(y)), and we conclude that u(X) - u(x) = u(Y) 
- u(y). This is the same conclusion as under EU. Hence 
the TO method can be used for utility elicitation under 
these more general theories. 
Unfortunately, as was discovered by Fishburn (1978), 
weighting formulas as in Formula (3) above, where the 
weights need not sum to 1, violate basic principles such 
as stochastic dominance. Therefore new generalizations 
of EU have been developed, where weights depend on 
the rank-ordering of outcomes in such a manner that 
they always sum to 1. This idea was developed by Quig- 
gin (1981) in the context of decision under risk, where 
objective probabilities are given. Schmeidler (1989) 
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developed essentially the same idea in the context 
of decision under uncertainty, where probabilities 
need not be known. We refer to their theories as rank- 
dependent utility. Tversky and Kahneman (1992), and 
others, used the idea of rank-dependence to improve the 
theoretical part of prospect theory, leading to cumula- 
tive prospect theory. Here not only rank-dependence 
but also "sign-dependence" is relevant. As all outcomes 
in our experiments are assumed of the same sign, sign- 
dependence does not affect the valuations and the der- 
ivation below holds both for rank-dependent utility and 
for cumulative prospect theory. 
Under rank-dependence, gambles are valued as in 
Formula (3) above, but the weights s and t can depend 
on the ordering of X and x. They can be different when 
X 2 x than when X < x. They always sum to 1, so that 
we can substitute t = 1 - s. Thus, if X 2 x then the 
gamble (X, A; x) is valued by 
s x u(X) + (1-s) x u(x), (4) 
and if X < x the gamble is valued by 
s' x u(X) + (1-s') x u(x), (5) 
where s * s' is permitted. Note that, if X = x, either 
formula can be applied because both formulas yield the 
same result.7 
In the experiments, indifferences (xj, A; r) - (xj-1, A; 
R) were considered (j = 1, .. ., 4) where always xj 2 r, 
xjFl 2 R. In rank-dependent utility theory such gam- 
bles, which have the same ordering of outcomes, are 
called comonotonic. We can therefore adopt the valua- 
tion of Equation (4) with weight s for all experimental 
gambles, and the indifferences imply 
s(u(xj+1) - u(xj)) = (1 - s)(u(R) -u(r)), 
for all j. From this it follows that 
S(U(X1) 
-U(Xo)) = *-- = s(U(X4) -U(X3)), 
hence 
U(X1) 
-U(XO) = U.. = u(X4) - U(X3). 
7In the context of risk, where a probability p for A is given, the rank- 
dependent theories assume that s = f(p) and s' = 1 - f(l - p) for a 
"probability transformation" function f. In the context of uncertainty, 
s = W(A) and s' = 1 - W(not - A) for a weighting function W. 
If we set u(xo) = 0 and u(x4) = 1 then u(x1) = 4, U(X2) 
= 4 u(X3) = 3. Hence the utility elicitations of the TO 
method in our experiments retain full validity under 
rank-dependent utility and cumulative prospect theory! 
It means that the TO curves in Figure 7 are also valid 
utility curves under these non-EU theories (the other 
curves are not). 
Let us next discuss the general TO indifferences 
(xl, A; r) - (xo, A; R), . . . , (xn, A; r) - (x, A; R). 
Under rank-dependent utility, setting u(xo) = 0, u(x1) 
= 1/n, these indifferences still imply that u(xj) = j/n 
for all j as long as all gambles have the same rank- 
ordering of outcomes. That is, either r < R < xo or x, 
< r < R. Thus the TO method can be used under rank- 
dependent utility if one takes the values R, r outside of 
the domain of the xj's where utility should be elicited, 
i.e., R and r are uniformly greater or smaller than the 
values xj. Under cumulative prospect theory, an addi- 
tional restriction should be imposed in view of sign de- 
pendence, that is, the xj's should all be positive or they 
should all be negative. 
Utility elicitation for rank-dependent theories is dis- 
cussed in Quiggin (1981; 1992, ?10.7) and Mangelsdorff 
and Weber (1994). They invoke the simplifying as- 
sumption that probabilities 1/2 are not transformed. 
This means that for an event B with probability 1/2, 
gambles (X, B; x) are evaluated by 1/2 x u(X) + 1/2 
x u(x), as they would be under EU. Then the CE 
method of EU can be used to elicit utility. Empirical 
investigations of probability transformation have found 
that, on average, probabilities below 1 / 3 are trans- 
formed upward, probabilities above 1 / 3 are trans- 
formed downward, and the probability 1 /3 is not trans- 
formed. Hence Tversky and Fox (1995) elicited utilities 
from gambles (X, B; x) where X > x and the probability 
of B is 1 /3 instead of 1 /2. It seems that, on average, the 
probability 1/3 is more suited for utility elicitation than 
the more commonly used probability 1 /2. Still, gambles 
with probability 1/3 do not eliminate distortions due to 
probability transformations at the individual level. The 
TO method does provide elimination of those distor- 
tions at the individual level. 
Once utilities have been elicited, they can be used to 
elicit decision weights and thereby the probability trans- 
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formation function. Thus the TO method can be used to 
elicit the entire Choquet expected utility model and, ob- 
viously, the entire EU model if EU is assumed. 
Finally, we briefly show that the TO method can also 
elicit utility if utility depends on the state of nature. As- 
sume that a gamble (X, A; x) is evaluated by the form 
P(A)UA(X) + P(not-A)UnO1A(x). This generalizes ex- 
pected utility by permitting utility to be state-dependent, 
i.e., utility depends on the associated event and UA can 
be different from UnlOtA. An example where this is rea- 
sonable is when, before a trip to Japan, event A predicts 
that the exchange rate will increase by two cents to- 
morrow, and event not-A predicts that it will remain 
unchanged. Now consider the indifferences in Equation 
(2). From substitution it can be derived that these in- 
differences still imply the equality UA(X) - UA(X) 
= UA(Y) - UA(y). The TO method thus elicits standard 
sequences for the state-dependent utilities, and state- 
dependent utility functions can still be elicited up to a 
scale and location parameter. If the standard sequences 
for utility differ significantly for different events, then 
state-dependence has been detected. 
It is impossible, under state-dependent expected util- 
ity, to compare the scale parameters for the functions 
UA and UnlOtA above and, in general, for utility functions 
associated with different events. Therefore no probabil- 
ities can be elicited. The nonseparability of probabilities 
and utility for state-dependent expected utility is central 
in Nau (1994). 
5. Discussion: Advantages of the 
Trade-off Method over Other 
Methods 
We already mentioned the validity problem of direct 
scaling. An additional problem is that the results of di- 
rect scaling seem to be more susceptible to domain and 
framing effects (Nord 1992, p. 560 and Fischer 1995). 
We shall not discuss direct scaling further. 
Instead, we turn to the PE, CE, and lottery-equivalent 
methods. As these methods assume EU, they are sus- 
ceptible to the many violations of EU that have been 
reported in the literature. In particular, they use prob- 
abilities in the calculations and require precise knowl- 
edge of those probabilities. This assumes that clients un- 
derstand and correctly perceive probabilities, which has 
been a central problem in utility elicitation. Conse- 
quently, these methods cannot be used for events with 
unknown or ambiguous probabilities. As pointed out 
above, the TO method can be used in such situations. 
To avoid the distortions due to the certainty effect, 
variations of the CE and PE method have been proposed 
in which a client compares two lotteries that both in- 
volve risk, and then substitutes one of the outcomes or 
one of the probabilities to obtain indifference (Farquhar 
1984). The most well-known variation is the lottery- 
equivalent method introduced by McCord and de Neuf- 
ville (1986). It uses indifferences (X, p; 0) (x, q; 0), for 
O * p * 1 and 0 * q * 1, to elicit utility. Thus it reduces 
the disturbing effects of probability distortion but does 
not entirely discard it, and still requires precise knowl- 
edge of probability. 
An earlier study that also avoided the certainty effect 
was Davidson et al. (1957), who formalized and applied 
the early ideas of Ramsey (193 1). They used events with 
probability 2 (elicited from preference-symmetry) and 
used indifferences (X, -; x) - (Y, -; y) to elicit equalities 
u(X) - u(Y) = u(x) - u(y). Six outcomes were elicited 
that are equally spaced in utility. For each subject, only 
one choice was between a certain outcome and a lottery, 
all other questions concerned two-lottery choices. Ex- 
tensive cross-checkings were done. Next, by means of 
the elicited utilities, subjective probabilities of events 
were elicited. 
Note that the probability - is crucial in the Ramsey 
method. Prospect theory suggests that the obtained util- 
ity values will still overestimate the degree of risk aver- 
sion because the probability - is transformed downward 
by the average subject. 
Like the methods described above, the TO method 
avoids the certainty effect by using choices between two 
gambles rather than choices between a gamble and a 
certain outcome. In addition, it does not only reduce, 
but completely circumvents errors due to probability 
distortion. A disadvantage of "two-gamble" ap- 
proaches is that processing two gambles is somewhat 
more complicated than processing a gamble and a cer- 
tain outcome. We think, however, that the TO questions 
appeal to a natural intuition as subjects make decisions 
by weighing positive and negative arguments: they are 
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asked how much they need to gain in one event to 
match a loss in another event. As a result, we expect 
that the TO method will discourage the use of ad hoc 
decision heuristics (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986, 
?10.3; Tversky et al. 1988; Fischer 1995). 
Another advantage of the TO method is that gambles 
with specified probabilities need not be invoked. Such 
gambles may feel artificial and are problematic for sub- 
jects who are not familiar with probabilities. The elici- 
tation questions under the TO method can refer to 
events that are of interest to the client ("X if the market 
goes up, r if it does not"). Probabilities of such events 
are usually not known (contrary to the probabilities of 
lottery-wheel events). Dyckman and Salomon (1972) 
have suggested that artificial lotteries lead to distor- 
tions. They found that utility functions elicited by ran- 
dom devices such as colored chips in a box were rather 
different, usually displaying more risk-aversion than 
those based on simulations of actual decision situations. 
It had been known before that extraneous random 
devices with known probabilities are not needed to ax- 
iomatize EU. The first demonstration had been given by 
Savage in 1954.8 The TO method provides a similar re- 
sult for utility elicitation. 
The TO method is also well-suited for correcting mea- 
surement errors because cross-checkings are easily de- 
veloped. For example, for any reference outcomes r, R 
by means of which xo, . . . , xn are elicited, we can fix an 
outcome s that is different from r and ask the client for 
the outcome S > s such that the gambles (x1, A; s) and 
(xo, A; S) are indifferent. Then we can use s, S instead 
of the reference outcomes r, R and verify the indiffer- 
ences (xi,1, A; s) (xi, A; S). Under EU these indiffer- 
ences should hold for all i. 
Suppose for example that in the experiment in ?3 we 
find (x1, A; 0) (xo, A; 2) for a subject, where A de- 
scribes the event that the patient carries disease 1. Then 
8 The earlier attempt of Ramsey (1931) was incomplete, the approach 
of de Finetti (1937) had the drawback of assuming that utilities were 
known, and the approaches of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) 
and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) had the drawback of assuming 
given probabilities. Recent axiomatizations that avoid Savage's re- 
quirement of infinite state spaces are given by Wakker (1984, 1989, 
1993) and Gul (1992). 
we can take s = 0, S = 2, and verify the indifferences 
(x2, A; 0) - (x1, A; 2), (X3, A; 0) -(x2, A; 2), and (X4, A; 
0) - (X3, A; 2). If the client never deviates from EU then 
these indifferences should all hold. In practice, they can 
be used to independently measure the standard se- 
quence and can help to improve the accuracy of mea- 
surement. 
Note that the presence of inconsistencies in an indi- 
vidual's choices is a major reason for the existence of 
elicitation methods and decision analysis. Elicitation 
methods can help detect and remove inconsistencies 
that are due to human error. Prescriptive decision anal- 
ysis asks a client to resolve the inconsistencies detected 
by cross-checkings, rather than accept and study them 
through error theories as done in descriptive ap- 
proaches (Laskey and Fischer 1987, ?6.3). In addition, 
clients find utility elicitation more acceptable when they 
are informed of their inconsistencies and are encour- 
aged to modify their expressed preferences (Kimbrough 
and Weber 1994). 
Larger utility intervals can be used for cross-checking. 
If in the experiments of ?3 we were to find (x2, A; 0) 
- (xo, A; 5) for a subject, then under EU we should also 
find (X3, A; 0) - (x1, A; 5) and (X4, A; 0) - (x2, A; 5). 
These indifferences could then be used for a cross- 
checking. Note that we used zero years versus five 
years given not-A, instead of two years versus five 
years as in ?3. One can also check for standard- 
sequences conditional on other events or other verbal 
or numerical uncertainties. For instance, one can in- 
terchange the events A and not-A, and use indiffer- 
ences of the sort (t, A; xi+1) , (T, A; xi), for i = 1, . . ., 
n - 1, to elicit the standard sequence and for further 
cross-checkings. A "top down" elicitation can be 
used as an alternative. Then one starts with xn, and 
uses indifferences (xi, A; r) - (xj-1, A; R) to elicit xn1, 
... I xO. 
The TO method is also suited for theoretical work, 
and can be used to reformulate an axiomatic foundation 
of EU described by Wakker (1984, 1989) and Wakker 
and Tversky (1993). There EU was axiomatized by a 
"TO consistency" axiom. From that axiomatization it 
easily follows that a person violates EU if and only if 
inconsistencies can be produced by the TO elicitation 
procedure. In practice, EU will be discarded if the de- 
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viations from expected utility, uncovered by cross- 
checkings, are too large. 
Another feature of the TO method is that it strongly 
appeals to the intuition of strength of preference. The 
indifferences (xo, A; 5) (x1, A; 2) and (xi, A; 5) (xi, 
A; 2) in the experiments, for i = 1, 2, 3, suggest that the 
strength of preference of xi+1 over xi is as large as the 
strength of preference of x1 over xo. These indifferences 
are used to elicit corresponding equalities of utility dif- 
ferences. Still, the elicited utilities have been derived 
solely from "ordinal" indifferences and are not suscep- 
tible to the methodological criticisms of approaches that 
take strength of preference as a directly observable 
primitive. The elicited utilities do have full validity as 
vNM utilities. Thus the method may provide a bridge 
between risky cardinal utility and "value functions" 
that are to represent strengths of preferences (Dyer and 
Sarin 1982, Barron et al. 1984, Wakker 1984). 
For simplicity, we presented the TO method for quan- 
titative outcomes. It can also be used when outcomes 
are not quantified. Whatever the outcomes R, r and X, 
x, Y, y are in Equation (2), the indifferences elicit the 
equality U(X) - U(x) = U(Y) - U(y). The outcomes 
need not be final and definite, but may involve uncer- 
tainty and risk. Some flexibility concerning the outcome 
space is, however, required. In axiomatic analyses, a 
topological "connectedness" condition (Wakker 1989) 
or an algebraic "solvability" condition (Wakker 1991) 
suffice. For the TO elicitation procedure in ?2 it is nec- 
essary that the outcomes xo, x1, ..., xn, satisfying the 
required indifferences are available. A similar richness 
condition is required for the CE method. The PE method 
does not require richness of outcomes, but instead re- 
quires richness of the conceivable probabilities, which 
seems to be more convenient. 
The TO method provides alternative means of elicit- 
ing qualitative properties of utility. For instance, dimin- 
ishing marginal utility ("risk aversion") can be inferred 
if and only if all elicited standard sequences xo, . . ., Xn 
have increasing step sizes xj+1 - xj. The utility is a 
linear/exponential function if and only if standard se- 
quences are invariant under addition of a constant 
("constant absolute risk aversion," Keeney and Raiffa 
1976). Utility is a log/power function if and only if elic- 
ited standard sequences are invariant under multipli- 
cation by positive constants ("constant relative risk 
aversion," Keeney and Raiffa 1976). These results also 
hold true for rank-dependent utility and cumulative 
prospect theory. Characterizations of parametric fami- 
lies of utility for nonexpected utility models have been 
studied by Miyamoto (1988), Wakker and Tversky 
(1993), Miyamoto and Wakker (1996), Dyckerhoff 
(1994), and Fishburn (1995). 
In a mathematical sense, the TO method can be con- 
sidered to be a special case of multi-attribute utility the- 
ory where dimensions now refer to different resolutions 
of uncertainty. A topic that has been discussed exten- 
sively in multiattribute utility is the issue of distortions 
of attribute weights (Weber et al. 1988, Tversky et al. 
1988, Fischer and Hawkins 1993, von Nitzsch and We- 
ber 1993). A recent survey has been given by Borcherd- 
ing et al. (1995). In our context the attribute weights are 
the probabilities. These distortions of attribute weights / 
probabilities do not by themselves constitute a problem 
for the TO method. Only when the distortion effects 
change during the elicitation process, can they affect the 
results of the TO method. As an example, in the exper- 
iments we used matching judgments. It has been found 
that these lead to an overweighting of the dimension 
where the matching is to be done, and to excessive at- 
tention to the scale to be matched. However, this dis- 
tortion is the same for all revealed values, and therefore 
does not affect the elicited utility values. 
6. Disadvantages of the Tradeoff 
Method 
A disadvantage of the TO method is that it is somewhat 
more laborious than existing methods. In each choice, 
clients are confronted with two gambles rather than 
with a gamble and a certain outcome. Therefore, sub- 
jects will initially find the TO method harder to under- 
stand. This was indeed found in the experiments. We 
expect, however, that after some practice subjects will 
find the TO method easier to deal with than the CE or 
PE methods. A first reason is that the new matching 
value that is elicited per choice question is always based 
on a comparison with the same "reference" outcomes 
under the opposite event. In the life-duration experi- 
ment, the reference outcomes were always two years 
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and five years under disease 2, in the monetary exper- 
iment they were 10 and 80 under candidate 1. A second 
reason is that attention is focused on utility. 
Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986, ?10.3) pointed 
out that the CE method has the disadvantage of induc- 
ing subjects to anchor on expected value calculations, 
which can distort their responses. The TO method may 
have a similar disadvantage because an easy response 
strategy for subjects is to simply let the difference be- 
tween x; and xjFl be the same for all j. In our experi- 
ments, 16 of the 81 subjects used the mentioned re- 
sponse strategy in the TO questions, while 20 subjects 
resorted to expected value calculations in the CE ques- 
tions. 
The TO method is also more laborious because, to 
elicit n - 1 utility values,9 n indifferences must be ob- 
served. The CE and PE method need one observation 
less to elicit the same number of utilities. This is so be- 
cause the CE and PE methods assume one additional 
parameter given: the probability. Often a specific para- 
metric family has already been deemed appropriate for 
the utility, and utility elicitation is only used to deter- 
mine the parameter(s) of the parametric family. For in- 
stance, if a power family u(x) = xr is chosen, then only 
a few preference indifferences need to be observed for 
the assessment of the ("risk") parameter r (for multiat- 
tribute utility theory, compare Kirkwood and Sarin 
1980). The TO method can also be used to identify such 
parameters, again at the expense of additional questions 
but with more robustness. 
Another disadvantage of the TO method is that re- 
sponses are "chained": previously elicited values must 
be invoked to elicit new utility values. The elicitation of 
X3 requires the value x2 as an input, etc. Responses are 
also chained in the bisection version of the CE method. 
They are neither in the basic CE method nor in the PE 
method. The problem with chaining is that the elicita- 
tion procedure is more complicated and that errors 
propagate. The error in the elicitation of, say, the ninth 
value can be expected to be three times larger than the 
error in the elicitation of the first value if errors are in- 
9That is, u(x2), ..., u(x,), after arbitrarily setting u(xo) = 0, u(x1) 
= l/n. 
dependent and identically distributed. Cross-checkings 
can, however, easily be developed for the TO method 
to reduce those errors. 
Finally, only one boundary value can be fixed for the 
TO method, such as the minimal starting level xo in the 
description of ?1, or a maximal starting level in the "top 
down" method described in ?5. The decision analyst 
cannot entirely control the location of the other bound- 
ary value that will be elicited. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has discussed the tradeoff method for elic- 
iting von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. The method 
is robust against distortions of probabilities and can be 
applied when probabilities are ambiguous or unknown. 
Probabilities can even be presented verbally. Also, the 
method can be adapted to rank-dependent nonexpected 
utility. Experiments suggest that the tradeoff method is 
less affected by deviations from EU than the CE and PE 
methods. The primary application of the tradeoff 
method lies in prescriptive decision analysis, where ra- 
tional and truly representative utilities are to be con- 
structed under guidance of a decision analyst, and 
where the method appeals to a rational decision pro- 
cess: the weighing of arguments.10 
'o The authors appreciate the helpful comments made by Hein Fen- 
nema, Bob Nau, Rakesh Sarin, Anne Stiggelbout, Lia Verhoef, and Bob 
Winkler. 
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